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What makes some wars longer and more severe than others is an important question in 
international relations scholarship.  One underexplored answer to this question is the role that 
third party joiners play in lengthening conflicts, especially those states that intervene militarily 
after a war’s initial stages.  This article argues that late joining complicates bargaining by adding 
new issues to the war and increases uncertainty about the relative balance of forces.  Thus, more 
information will be needed to resolve the bargaining impasse.  This means additional fighting 
and a longer war.  This lengthening in turn increases the number of casualties.  This is a distinct 
process from simply having more participants in a war from the outset as those participants 
would not add uncertainty in the same way that late joiners do, as questions about how those 
participants affect the relative balances of forces would be answered just as quickly as if there 
were only two participants at the outset.  These claims are supported by a non-proportional 
hazards model regression, a Cox proportional hazards regression, and an ordinary least squares 
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 Why some wars are more severe and last longer than others has often been asked.  While 
useful answers have been generated, part of the puzzle has been neglected:  third party joining.  
Studies on joining have focused on which states join wars, why they join, and even when they 
join rather than on how joining wars affects the wars themselves.  Using an informational 
approach, the article argues late joining is correlated with increased war duration independent of 
having more participants.  This relationship is due to joining increasing duration rather than 
longer wars providing greater opportunity for joining to occur.  Additionally, intervention on 
both sides of the conflict has a greater affect than states joining just one side.  Finally, longer 
duration leads to greater severity. 
 Joining matters in the larger scheme of war research for several reasons.  First, if joining 
affects not only which side will win, but also the length and severity of wars, then policy 
decisions should be made with these effects in mind.  Prior to launching wars, decision-makers 
undoubtedly factor in the expected costs of wars.  If joining increases those costs significantly, 
then leaders will have to weigh the probability that joining will occur and should be less likely to 
launch wars in which they expect joining to occur.  This should partially censor such wars even 
if the odds of winning are not seriously altered.  Thus, how joining affects war duration and war 
severity should have implications not only for potential interveners, but also for what sort of 
wars are likely to occur in the first place.  Finally, if joining produces the most severe wars, then 
concerns about the destructive nature of war should focus not only on preventing the outbreak of 
war, but also on keeping wars from spreading.  Many leaders appear to think in these terms.
1
 
Late joining, defined as joining after a war’s first month, lengthens wars in a number of 
ways.  First, joiners may have goals that differ significantly from those of the initial belligerents.  
This complicates bargaining and makes finding bargains which are acceptable to all sides more 
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difficult.  Second, additional battles are required to resolve the increased uncertainty about the 
relative balance of forces.
2
  The number of participants is not significantly correlated with longer 
wars, suggesting that it is joining and not simply the multilateral nature of the wars that 
lengthens them.  This is true for wars where joining occurs on one or both sides.  Joining, 
however, is not directly related to the number of deaths.  Rather it is related to war severity 
indirectly through increased duration.  Thus, joining affects the nature of the war being fought. 
Existing Explanations of War Duration 
 Despite the field’s tendency to focus on the causes of war, two main explanations of 
war duration have been generated that are consistent with the informational conception of 
war:  that states’ regime types and states’ strategies affect the length of wars. 
Regime Type 
 Mixed regimes—those regimes which are neither highly repressive nor democratic—
tend to fight longer wars (Bennett & Stam, 1996).  This is because publics have an incentive 
to punish leaders that perform badly during wars in order to discourage future leaders from 
engaging in wars which are either unduly costly or have very low probabilities of success 
(Downs & Rocke, 1994).  Due to asymmetric information, it is often difficult or impossible 
for publics to assess leaders’ performances given the constraints they faced.  Thus, in order to 
maintain a credible deterrent on reckless behavior, publics must punish all leaders associated 
with failed war policies.  While this incentive to punish failed leaders exists across regime 
types, Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson (1995) find that the risk of being removed is greater for 
democratic regimes than authoritarian regimes.  Goemans (2000) goes further, finding that 
leaders in different regime types face not only different odds of being punished but also 
significantly different punishments for failure.  This affects the way leaders respond to 
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negative information revealed by a war.  Additionally, Goemans incorporates Jagger & Gurr’s 
(1995) argument that there are two types of authoritarian regimes:  dictatorships and mixed 
regimes.  Specifically, he argues that leaders in democracies and dictatorships will likely face 
severe punishment, such as incarceration, exile, or death, only if they lose a war very badly.  
Thus, such leaders are willing to end wars even if they are faced with a mild defeat.  Leaders 
of mixed regimes, however, are often severely punished even after mild defeats.  They, 
therefore, have an incentive to gamble for resurrection when faced with negative information 
in hopes the war will turn around even though the odds are slight and continued fighting will 
likely cause significant damage to their state.  This is because such leaders’ personal fates are 
equally grim in the face of both minor and major defeats; therefore, they have nothing to lose 
personally by continued fighting.  Leaders of democracies and dictatorships may have some 
incentive to gamble for resurrection; however, it exists only to the extent that gambling will 
not greatly increase the severity of defeat and the scale of punishment they would receive 
from defeat.  Hence, wars involving mixed regimes should last longer on average. 
War Fighting Strategies 
 
 The strategies states employ also directly affect the duration of wars.  Bennett & Stam 
(1996) argue there are three main types of war fighting strategies:  maneuver; attrition; and 
punishment.  Maneuver strategies attempt to win wars using speed and mobility to disrupt 
their opponents’ ability to organize their forces.  Attrition strategies attempt to wear down the 
opponent by destroying enemy forces.  Finally, punishment strategies attempt to win wars not 
by defeating enemy forces in the field, but rather by inflicting sufficient pain on opponents to 
convince them to cease fighting.  Bennett and Stam find that wars involving at least one side 
employing maneuver strategies should be have the shortest duration and that wars in which at 
5 
 
least one side employs a punishment strategy should be the longest.
3
  Thus, both regime type 
and war fighting strategies play roles in determining war duration.  However, third party 
joining also plays an important role. 
Late Joining and Duration 
 Like work on duration, previous work on joining has been limited.  Existing 
scholarship has focused on which states join, why they join, and when they join.  Little, 
however, has been said about how joining will change the course of wars beyond noting that it 
should alter the likelihoods of which side will win.  The rest of the literature on the behavior 
of third parties has focused on alliance reliability, crisis bargaining, or the propensity of states 
to balance or bandwagon and offers little insight into the connections between third parties 
and duration. 
 Still, the literature has provided some building blocks for a theory of how joining 
affects duration.  Several studies argue the process of joining alters the nature of those wars 
which experience it either by changing the issues over which it is fought or by increasing the 
odds of further intervention (Kim, 1991; Shirkey, 2009; Yamamoto & Bremer, 1980).  More 
directly, Regan (2002) finds that outside intervention in intrastate conflicts tends to increase 
the duration of those disputes by complicating the bargaining process and introducing 
additional issues into the conflict.  This should lead to greater uncertainty and Slantchev 
(2004) argues increased uncertainty increases war duration.  This complicating of the 
bargaining process should lead to longer and more costly wars.  Wars are in part rational 
bargaining processes (Fearon, 1995).  This suggests states will not leave wars until there is 
sufficient information available to resolve the bargaining impasse. This is because wars 
continue until there is a change in the calculations of one of the actors (Fox, 1970).  In other 
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words, in rational war, war termination is endogenous (Slantchev, 2004).  The decision to 
continue fighting is a political decision, just like the decision to initiate or join a war (Bennett 
& Stam, 1996).  Changes in such calculations should come about only if new information 
becomes available (Filson & Werner, 2002).  States learn from new information and react to 
the new probable outcome of the war by changing both their strategy within the war and their 
proposals for settlement.  Only changes to states’ demands can lead to the termination of the 
war as the benefits of war are endogenous and cannot change; only states’ demands can 
change (Goemans, 2000).  Demands will likely change as states’ perceptions about the course 
of the war and their estimates about their probable costs and likelihood of victory change.  
These changes in perception and estimates rationally should be tied to new information.  New 
information supersedes information that was available antebellum and causes belligerents to 
change their demands and how they pursue their goals (Goemans, 2000).  Thus, it is this new 
information that leads to war termination. 
 This is related to joining in several ways.  Joining complicates the bargaining 
environment (Valeriano & Vasquez, 2010).  The more complex the bargaining environment, 
the more difficult it will be to disentangle, and thus likely more information will be required 
to end the war.  The more information that is needed the longer the war should last 
(Slantchev, 2004).  Joining can logically complicate the bargaining environment in one of two 
ways.  First, it is possible that simply having more participants should increase the complexity 
of the bargaining (Valeriano & Vasquez, 2010).  For example, Cunningham (2006) argues 
that more belligerents in civil wars lengthen those wars due to more information asymmetries 
and more potential veto players resulting in fewer possible acceptable agreements.  
Additionally, Cunningham finds external intervention can produce these same affects.  Thus, 
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for Cunningham, it matters little if the additional participants are original belligerents or if 
they are joiners.  Of course, Cunningham’s findings require that belligerents be able to 
continue the war unilaterally; thus a large number of minor powers in a war with a single 
great power may be less lengthy holding all else equal than a war with many states of 
relatively equal power.  If this logic is correct, more participants should be correlated with 
longer wars, though this would run counter to Vuchinich & Teachman (1993). 
 Second, joining can introduce new goals and issues into the war.  Allied initial 
belligerents often share very similar goals and may essentially share a bargaining position.  If 
so, the overall bargaining is not much more complex than it would have been in a bilateral 
conflict.  However, joiners may bring additional issues into the war—issues which their allies 
have little interest in, but which are points of contention between the new belligerent and their 
foes.  This is consistent with Yamamoto & Bremer (1980) who find great power intervention 
increases the likelihood of further intervention because the scope of issues over which the war 
is being fought has been widened.  For example, Bismarck sought to avoid even pro-Prussian 
intervention in the Franco-Prussian War out of concern that allies would introduce new issues 
and prevent the war from being fought solely for German aims (Shirkey, 2009).  Such new 
issues are more likely to be introduced by late joiners rather than early joiners as early joiners 
should share more goals in common with the initial belligerents on their side—at least as they 
relate to the war—than would late joiners.  Early joiners will tend to join to honor pre-war 
alliances—alliances which were likely formed to advance the initial belligerents’ goals as 
they relate to the war in question.  Late joiners on the other hand will enter the war because of 




 In addition to complicating bargaining by adding new issues, joining may make it 
more difficult to determine which side is going to win and by how much.  This is because 
while prior battles in the war may have given a good indication of which side was going to 
win and by how much, the military capabilities of the new belligerents and how they will 
interact with those of the other belligerents will be less well known.  Of course, there will be 
some estimate as to the strength and effectiveness of the new forces, but they will not be as 
precise as those made after battles.  Most notably, if there is joining on both sides, it may 
become quite unclear which side has benefited the most from the entry of the new 
belligerents.  Similarly, the losing side may receive reinforcements making them more likely 
to win than before, but whether the added strength will be enough to turn the tide may be 
unclear.
4
  Thus, additional battles, and therefore, time will be needed to sort out the new 
relative balance of power.  This should not apply to early joiners as their effect on the balance 
of forces will be learned at the same time as the balance of forces between the original 
belligerents is discovered—in the initial battles. 
 Relatedly, Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, & Joyce (2008) find that one-sided outside 
involvement shortens civil wars, though two-sided intervention can lengthen it.  This suggests 
increased duration is due in part to a balancing of the belligerents’ forces rather than solely 
due to introducing additional issues or demands.  Thus, both one- and two-sided joining 
should lengthen wars due to the addition of new demands, but two-sided joining should have 
a greater effect overall as it should also increase uncertainty about the balance of relative 
forces in more cases than one-sided joining. 
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 Admittedly, these effects partially depend on the initial belligerents not anticipating 
intervention.  Obviously, this is not always the case.  However, states which antebellum are 
expected and have strong motives to intervene likely will join early and often will be allied 
with one of the initial belligerents.  Notably, alliances are only a reliable predictor of 
intervention in the first month of a war (Shirkey, 2009).  Also, to the extent joining is driven 
by reputational concerns, states will honor their commitments quickly or not at all.  Such 
expected joiners would have little incentive to delay entry, but if they did delay it would 
create uncertainty about whether they would actually join.  Thus, initial belligerents should 
have difficulty anticipating late joining, though they may be able to anticipate early joining. 
War Severity 
 
Factors that affect war severity differ from those that affect duration.  First, the longer a 
war lasts, the more opportunities there are for casualties.  Second, factors which reduce the 
intensity of combat should reduce severity.  Given that punishment strategies often take the form 
of guerilla insurgencies, they should result in fewer battles per time period and thus be less 
severe per unit of time.  Of course, such a strategy may lengthen the war and thus ultimately 
increase the war’s severity.  Once duration is controlled for, however, punishment strategies 
should reduce severity since they lower the number of deaths for any given time period.  Third, 
the presence of great powers may increase severity as they have the resources to both inflict and 
absorb high levels of casualties.  Additionally, great power wars may be fought over major issues 
such as the structure of the international system and become exceptionally costly.  Such effects 
should be clearest with great powers on both sides, but may also exist even if great powers are 
only on one side. 
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Finally, it is worth considering whether joining plays a role in war severity.  That wars 
which experience joining have more deaths is readily apparent.  The average war in COW has 
45,849 deaths, while those that experienced joining averaged 1,700,977 deaths.  Those 
experiencing late joining were even more severe, averaging 2,875,976 deaths.  Thus, exploring 
the relationship between casualties and joining is natural.  It is unlikely, however, that there will 
be a direct relationship between joining and severity.  Why not?  This can be discerned from 
those variables suggested to have a direct effect.  The presence of great powers on both sides 
creates an ability to inflict and incur large numbers of casualties.  Similarly, duration indicates 
the amount of time over which casualties can be inflicted.  Punishment strategies lower intensity.  
Late joining does none of these.  Late joining can complicate bargaining, thereby lengthening 
wars as more information will have to be revealed to find an acceptable settlement, but it cannot 
directly make it more costly once time is taken into consideration.  It can, of course, increase 
severity indirectly by increasing duration but it should not directly increase severity. 
Methodology and Results 
 There are a number of concrete hypotheses which can be derived from the above 
discussion.  First, late joining should increase the duration of wars.  Two-sided late joining 
should increase duration more than one-sided late joining.  Early joining should not be 
associated with longer duration as early joiners will likely have been antebellum allies with 
the initial belligerents and have bargaining positions similar to the initial belligerents.  
Additionally, how early joiners affect the balance of forces will be learned in the initial battles 
at the same time how the original belligerents affect the balance of forces is being learned.  
This effect should be the result of joining rather than simply increasing the number of 
belligerents.  Of course, holding all else equal, longer wars should have more deaths as there 
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will have been more time for states to inflict damage on each other though wars involving 
punishment strategies should be less severe. 
 To these hypotheses must be added the previous theories about the roles that strategy 
and regime type play in war duration.  First, maneuver strategies should shorten conflicts, 
while attrition and punishment strategies should lengthen them.  Second, incentives to gamble 
for resurrection should make wars involving mixed regimes longer, but they should not 
directly make wars more severe. 
 Finally, several control variables need to be added to any analysis as it is possible that 
other factors may affect duration or severity.  First, difficult terrain may increase duration or 
reduce severity (Bennett & Stam, 1996; DeRouen & Sobek, 2004).  Second, the presence of 
great powers may increase the duration and severity of the war.  Third, the relative balance of 
capabilities may affect the length of the war.  Previous findings suggest that wars with balanced 
relative capabilities may be longer than those with imbalanced capabilities; however, no 
connection between population size and either the duration of a war or the number of casualties 
has been found (Bennett & Stam, 1996).  Fourth, the number of belligerents may affect war 
duration though Vuchinich & Teachman (1993) have found otherwise.  Fifth, wars fought over 
more contentious issues such as territory or a state’s regime may be longer and more severe than 
wars fought over other issues such trade disputes or a desire to punish an opposing regime 
without attempt to seize territory or overthrow the regime.
5
  Last, it is possible that wars 
involving enduring rivalries may be longer or more severe than other wars. 
Data Sources and Variable Descriptions 
 The wars included in this analysis were taken from the Correlates of War (COW) dataset 
on interstate wars, i.e., those conflicts with over 1,000 battle deaths that were fought between 
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territorial states which qualified as members of the international state system.
6
  The dataset 
includes 79 wars fought between 1816 and 1997.  Two datasets were created, one where each 
case represents a war-day in a given war and another where each war is a single case.  The 
dependent variables, duration in days and battle deaths, were taken directly from COW.  
Duration is the number of days from the onset of the war to its conclusion.
7
 
Many of the control variables were taken from COW as well.  States were determined to 
be belligerents if they suffered at least 100 battle deaths or had at least 1,000 troops engaged in 
active combat.   The number of belligerents equals the maximum number of states involved at a 
given time for the war as a single case dataset and equals the number of states involved on a 
given date for the war-day dataset.  States were considered to be joiners if they became 
belligerents after the first day of combat according to COW.  COW determines dates of 
participation based on formal declarations of war unless that state’s first combat preceded the 
declaration.  If so, the date of initial combat is used.  Joining was further broken down into 
several variables. States which entered in the first 31 days of a war were considered early joiners; 
late joiners entered after day 31.  While this, or any other cutoff, is inherently somewhat 
arbitrary, the results below hold if a two, three, or six month cutoff is used instead.
8
  In the war-
days dataset, the joining variable was depreciated over time in a linear fashion.  On the day 
joining occurred, the variable has a value of one, but it depreciates in a linear fashion to zero 
after a quarter of a year.
9
  In the war as a single case dataset variables for one- and two-sided 
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joining were created.  One-sided joining indicates that all interveners joined one side of the war.  
Two-sided joining indicates that at least one state joined on each side of the war.  These variables 
were included only in the war as a single case dataset, because whether joining was one- or two-
sided does not say anything about a particular state’s entry, but rather the sum of entries.  Thus, 
calling a particular state’s entry two-sided or one-sided does not make sense, but it is logical to 
talk about if a war experienced joining on both sides or only on one side. 
Dummy variables record whether a great power was in the war and if great powers were 
on each side of the conflict.  Whether a belligerent was considered a major power was taken 
from the COW state membership dataset.
10
  Dummy variables, taken from COW’s militarized 
interstate dispute dataset, also indicate if the war was fought over territorial issues or a 
belligerent’s regime because wars fought over territory or a state’s regime may last longer than 
wars fought over less salient matters.
11
  A dispute was judged to be territorial in nature if a state 
attempted to revise the status quo by making claims on or attempts to permanently seize territory.  
A dispute was deemed to be about a state’s regime if another state made an attempt to overthrow 
or change its opponent’s government.  Finally, the relative capabilities of the belligerents were 
taken from the COW National Material Capabilities dataset.
12
   The relative capabilities were 
derived by taking the sum of the COW Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) scores 
for the stronger side and dividing it by the sum of both sides’ capabilities. Thus, it always has a 
value between 0.5 and one.  This results in a reasonably normally distributed variable.  CINC 
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scores were taken from the first year of the war for regressions which treated wars as a single 
case.
13
  In regressions where wars were broken down into days, the CINC scores vary as states 
enter and leave and as belligerents’ CINC scores change.   
 The other control variables were taken from non-COW sources.  States were classified as 
democracies, mixed regimes, or dictatorships using classification based on the Polity IV dataset 
(Marshall & Jaggers, 2007).  The regime type was derived using a twenty-one point scale created 
by subtracting the autocracy index from the democracy index in the Polity IV database.  Regimes 
with a score of seventeen or greater are democracies, while regimes with a score of six or less are 
dictatorships.  Regimes scoring from seven to sixteen are coded as mixed regimes.
14
  This 
resulted in two dummy variables:  one for mixed regimes and one for democracies.  Whether or 
not an enduring rivalry was present in the war was taken from Diehl & Goertz (2000).  States 
were considered to be rivals if they engaged in a series of militarized interstate disputes within 
10 to 15 years of each other.  The terrain and strategy variables were taken directly from Bennett 
& Stam (1996).  Strategy is captured by a series of dummy variables pairing the offensive side’s 
and defensive side’s strategies (maneuver, attrition, or punishment).  Maneuver strategies were 
those which involved blitzkrieg strategies or attempts to divide the enemy forces.  Attrition 
strategies were those where meeting engagements were fought.  Punishment strategies were 
those wars that were primarily guerilla in nature or where civilians were the main target.  This 
framework results in potentially nine combinations, but only five occur in their dataset:  offense 
attrition-defense maneuver (OADM); offense attrition-defense attrition (OADA); offense 
attrition-defense punishment (OADP); offense punishment-defense attrition (OPDA); and 
offense maneuver-defense attrition (OMDA).  The last variable was excluded from the analyses 
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as Bennett and Stam argue it should lead to the quickest wars and of course one dummy variable 
must be excluded.  The terrain variable ranges from zero to one with zero being open or rolling 
terrain and one being impassible.
15
  See Tables Ia through Id for the summary statistics.
16
 
[Tables Ia to Id here] 
Results for Duration 
 To determine whether joining lengthens wars, a Cox proportional hazards model would 
seem a natural fit.
17
  However, Cox models assume that variables affect the hazard rate 
proportionately over the course of time.  In other words, it assumes variables affect only the scale 
and not the shape of the hazard function.  This may not be true and can be checked using 
Schoenfeld residuals (Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, & Zorn, 2003).  This procedure reveals late 
joining and several of the strategy variables potentially violate the proportional hazards 
assumption.  For this reason, a non-proportional hazards model with a Weibull distribution was 
used allowing the variables which violated the proportional hazards assumption to also affect the 
shape of the hazard function.  Only variables which affected the shape parameter in a statistically 
significant way were included in the final models to prevent such variables from obscuring 
affects they have on the scale of the hazard function (Cleves, et al, 2008). Late joining is the only 
such variable.  Since the hazard rate is not proportional, coefficients rather than standard hazard 
ratios are reported. 
Additionally, to ensure the findings are not being driven by the entries of minor states 
into ongoing wars additional models were included where only major belligerents were counted 
as joiners, belligerents, democracies, mixed regimes, or enduring rivals.  For other variables such 
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as relative capabilities and battle deaths, the contributions of minor belligerents were included.  
The list of major belligerents was taken from the War Initiation and Termination Coding 
Instrument and Data Set (WIT) (Fazal, et al, 2009).  WIT codes major belligerents as those states 
which are principal decision makers in the war, i.e., states which can make decisions about war 
and peace for the war as a whole or states whose troop contributions are large enough to make 
them independent decision-makers.  To these states the great powers as listed in COW were 
added.  Also, as data on the strategy and terrain variables were only available for 63 of the 79 
wars, regressions were run both with those variables included and excluded.  This treatment 
results in four models for both datasets for a total of eight models. 
The results for all four models using the war-day dataset are reported in Table II.  Late 
joining is significantly correlated with a large increase in duration.  This is not immediately 
obvious, as the affects of late joining on the scale and shape parameters run in opposite 
directions.  Thus, is it necessary to calculate predicted values for when late joining occurs 
holding all other variables at their medians.  This shows late joining increases the average 
duration of wars substantially.  In the four models late joining increases duration by 603, 543, 44, 
and 229 days respectively.  In percentage terms these are increases of 164%, 155%, 8%, and 
68% respectively.  The greater increases are when all joiners are included.  The results hold even 
if the Vietnam War, a clear outlier at 3,735 days, is excluded. 
In all four models early joining is significantly correlated with shorter wars—340 days 
shorter on average.  Why this happens can be seen by examining the eight wars which had only 
early joining.  All of them had joining only on one side.  Three wars involved great powers 
joining the side that was stronger militarily (Roman Republic, Six Weeks, and Sinai).  Another 
involved minor powers joining to bandwagon after the issue had been decided (Second Balkans) 
17 
 
and finally one involves minor powers trying to bandwagon, albeit unsuccessfully (Yom 
Kippur).
18
  Thus, in many of these wars the balance of forces was made even more unbalanced 
by joining, and yet the joiners did not have either the power or desire to significantly increase 
war demands.
19
  In several of the wars the entries had been worked out antebellum.
20
  Thus, they 
added no issues and did not in any way alter their side’s calculations as their entries were 
expected by their allies. 
The number of belligerents is not significantly correlated with duration.  This suggests 
that simply increasing the number of belligerents does not complicate the bargaining process in 
the way late joining does.  As was argued above, many initial belligerents likely share or nearly 
share preferred goals and outcomes.  Late joiners, however, introduce additional goals into the 
war.  Indeed if they closely shared the goals of the initial belligerents, they likely would have 
joined the war at its outset or at least in the first month. 
[Table II here] 
The findings for the control variables are interesting as well.  Having a mixed regime in 
the war increased duration by an average of about 291 days between the four models.  OADA 
strategies lengthened wars on average by over a year when compared to the base strategy.  
Punishment strategies, when employed by either side, had the potential to increase the duration 
of the conflict by over a decade.  OADM strategies were not consistently significant.  Less 
balanced relative capabilities were correlated with shorter wars.  Increasing the imbalance of 
capabilities by one standard deviation from the median shortened wars when the strategy 
                                                 
18
 The other wars are the Austro-Sardinian, Italian Unification, and Pacific. 
19
 Modena, Tuscany, and France shared Sardinia’s goals of expelling Austria from the Italian peninsula.  France 
shared Austria’s goal of destroying the Roman Republic.  Romania and Turkey shared Greece’s and Serbia’s goal of 
taking territory from Bulgaria.  Britain and France shared Israel’s goal of restoring international control of the Suez 
Canal.  Finally, Saudi Arabia and Jordan shared the rest of the Arab states’ goal of destroying Israel.  Italy had 
substantially divergent goals from Prussia in the Six Weeks War, but was unable to continue the conflict on its own.   
20
 French participation in the War of Italian Unification, Italian participation in the Six Weeks War, and British and 
French participation in the Sinai War were all prearranged. 
18 
 
variables were included by roughly 139 and 229 days respectively.  The presence of 
democracies, enduring rivals, and great powers in the war and whether the war was fought over 
territory or a target state’s regime were all insignificant.  The presence of difficult terrain was 
significant, but in the opposite direction from what was predicted.  Strangely, difficult terrain is 
correlated with shorter wars.  Why this should be is unclear.  Even if rougher terrain results in 
states employing attrition or punishment strategies and the lengthening effect terrain has on war 
is captured by these variables, this should just reduce the impact of the terrain variable, not make 
it significant in the opposite direction.
21
 
A potential objection to the findings is that there is a selection effect at work for one of 
two reasons.  First, it is possible that long wars simply have more time for joining, especially late 
joining, to occur and thus the causation is potentially backwards.  As can be seen in Table III, 
this is unlikely the case.  Wars experiencing late joining last 935 days longer on average after 
late joining has occurred than wars which experienced no joining do for their entire duration.  
Thus, it is not the length of wars that allows late joining to occur as vast majority of those wars’ 
duration comes after late joining has already occurred.  Therefore, if there is a causal relationship 
between late joining and duration, it is far more likely late joining increases duration rather than 
vice versa.  Second, it is possible that the relationship could be spurious and that some other 
variable both makes wars longer and more likely to experience joining.  While possible, it is not 
clear what this variable would be.  Late joining is poorly correlated with the strategy and regime 
type variables which have been found to increase duration.
22
  Also, as longer wars are more 
                                                 
21
 OADP, great powers on both sides, and regime issue all have correlations with other variables above 0.6.  
Dropping them slightly changes the results. In model one, early joining and relative capabilities cease to be 
significant. Using the log of duration has no affect on significance beyond making OADM statistically insignificant 
in model 3. 
22
 The correlation is 0.093 or lower for these variables. Including variables for previous wars or UN involvement has 
little effect. Early joining is not strongly correlated with the models’ error terms. Late joining has correlations of -
0.45, -0.46, -0.21, and -0.22 in models 1 to 4 respectively. 
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costly (see Table V), it is not clear why such wars should be more attractive, rather than less 
attractive, to join.  The most logical possibility is that wars fought over the nature of the system 
will attract joiners and have a tendency to be lengthy in their own right; however, late joining 
remains correlated with increased duration even if the world wars, those wars which were most 
clearly fought over the rules of the system, are excluded.  Thus, while a selection effect is 
possible, it is an unlikely explanation of the connection between late joining and duration. 
[Table III here] 
 Of course, while simply knowing late joining may lengthen wars is interesting, looking at 
how different types of late joining are related to duration is important as well.  In particular, two-
sided joining should be associated with greater increases in uncertainty about the relative balance 
of forces than one-sided joining.  However, both late one-sided and late two-sided joining should 
be associated with increases in the complexity of bargaining not related to the relative balance of 
forces.  Thus, comparing the effects of these two types of late joining may say something about 
how it lengthens wars.  For these models, the strategy variables were collapsed into three 
dichotomous variables:  one indicating if either side used a maneuver strategy; one indicating if 
either side used a punishment strategy; and one indicating if both sides used an attrition strategy.  
This was done as breaking the strategies down further resulted in dummy variables that were 
positive in only one or two instances which led to convergence issues.  A Cox proportional 
hazard model was used as the Schoenfeld residuals indicated that the data were consistent with 
the proportional hazard assumption.  The results are displayed in Table IV. 
[Table IV here] 
Both types of late joining were significant.  Late one-sided joining reduced the odds the 
war would end at any given point by between 87.2% and 93.1% depending on the model, while 
20 
 
late two-sided joining reduced the odds by between 96.8% and 99.0%.  Thus, the effect for two-
sided joining is quite a bit larger than the effect for one-sided joining suggesting that increases in 
the uncertainty about the balance of forces is an important cause of duration.  Neither type of 
early joining was statistically significant.  Again the results hold even if the Vietnam and world 
wars are excluded. 
For the most part, the results for the control variables remain unchanged.  Punishment 
strategies continue to be correlated with longer wars and maneuver strategies to a lesser extent 
with shorter wars.  The presence of mixed regimes is still associated with longer wars; however, 
this is only true for the models where only major belligerents are considered.  These are all 
consistent with the predicted effects.  One change is that having more belligerents is now 
correlated with shorter wars if only major belligerents are considered.  This result is puzzling.  
Rough terrain is not correlated with duration.  Territorial disputes are significant in the first 




Results for Severity 
 How joining affects war severity was also examined.  The variables are the same as 
before, except that the log of battle deaths is now the dependent variable and duration has 
become an independent variable.  As the dependent variable is now a positive continuous 
variable, ordinary least squares is an appropriate model.  The log of battle deaths is used as 
otherwise the data have a right tailed skew and exhibit kurtosis because several wars have 
millions of battle deaths while most have a few thousand.  Using the log of deaths results in a 
                                                 
23
 Dropping the belligerents variable due to collinearity results in mixed regimes not being significant in models 7 
and 8. Early one-sided joining becomes significant in model 8. Using the log of duration does not change the 
statistical significant of any of the variables. Stratifying the Cox model based on if states fought a war with each 
other in the previous 25 years had very little effect on the analysis. Two sided late joining has correlations with the 
error term of 0.31 in all four models.  One sided late joining has correlations of 0.58, 0.52, 0.39, and 0.35.  
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dependent variable that is far more normally distributed, therefore, meeting the assumptions of 
ordinary least squares regression.
24
  The results can be seen in Table V.
25
 
[Table V here] 
Duration and punishment strategies are statistically significant.  Of these, duration has the 
largest potential effect as it ranges from 5 to 3,735 days, while the strategy variables are 
dichotomous.  These findings were expected.  The results hold even if the world wars are 
excluded.  As anticipated, joining is not significant.  Joining, however, still plays a key role in 
explaining duration albeit indirectly.  Since late joining increases duration and duration increases 
the number of deaths, late joining indirectly increases severity.  None of the other variables is 
significant.  This is surprising as far as the presence of great powers on both sides is concerned 
as that should suggest a war in which each side can inflict and incur significant punishment. The 
issue over which the war was fought did not affect casualties nor did terrain.  Neither did the 
presence of an enduring rivalry, though this makes sense as the enduring rivalry hypothesis is 
that dyads will have a series of conflict with each other, not that any one of those conflicts 
individually will be more severe than the average war.  Regime type was also not significant.  
This is not surprising.  There is no compelling reason to think that regime type would directly 
affect the number of casualties, though of course to the extent that regime type affects duration, it 
indirectly affects severity.  Both the presence of a great power on one side and relative 
capabilities variable also were not significant.
26
 
                                                 
24
 Taking the log of battle deaths reduced the skew from 6.765 to 1.061 and the kurtosis from 49.817 to 3.826. 
25
 Variance inflation factors for the variables are all low except for the OADA variable which has factors of 5.57 and 
5.83.  These exceed the strict cut off of five potentially raising concerns about colinearity, but are well below the 
more lenient cutoff of ten.  See Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Neter (2004). 
26
 If the log of per capita deaths is used (see Lacina, 2006), great power status becomes negatively correlated with 
the dependent variable because death totals are a smaller proportion of their total population than they are for less 
populous states. Dropping the belligerents variable results in OADA being significant in column 3. Using the log of 
duration results in rivalry being significantly correlated with shorter wars in all four models and early joining with 




 The findings suggest that factors which complicate bargaining and increase uncertainty 
lengthen wars and that factors which increase duration and the rate of casualties increase 
severity.  Of these, the most important is that factors which complicate bargaining are correlated 
with longer wars.  Specifically, late joining lengthens wars by introducing new goals and 
additional uncertainty about the relative balance of forces.  Simply adding more players does not.  
Also, while longer wars are correlated with both one- and two-sided joining, the relationship 
with two-sided joining is stronger suggesting that uncertainty about the new relative balance of 
forces plays an important role in lengthening wars.  Additionally, early joining was not linked to 
longer wars.  Thus, not only does joining matter, but the type of joining also matters.  Finally, 
previous findings that mixed regimes and attrition and punishment strategies are correlated with 
longer wars were confirmed. 
 More complicated bargaining, however, does not directly translate to bloodier bargaining.  
Late joining was not directly related to the number of battlefield deaths.  Rather duration was 
correlated with higher casualties, while punishment strategies were correlated with lower 
casualties.  This is because these variables are indicators of each side’s ability to inflict and incur 
casualties due to more time or the strategy employed.  However, by increasing a war’s duration, 
late joining indirectly increases the number of casualties. 
These findings show that joining is important and deserves more far more attention than 
it has received.  Though a few scholars have worked on war expansion, most have ignored it to 
focus on war initiation, severity, or termination.  This study shows war termination and severity 
cannot be understood without understanding war expansion and other studies have shown war 
initiation cannot be understood without examining war expansion (Gartner & Siverson, 1996; 
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Shirkey, 2009; Smith, 1995).  Thus, in order to understand conflict in the international realm, we 
must study how those conflicts are fought and how initial non-belligerents respond to them, not 
just their onset and termination.  These sorts of connections too often are not drawn leading to a 
poorer understanding of why and how states fight.  The findings herein suggest that joining alters 
the nature and costs of wars.  For this reason, states will likely factor the odds that joining will 
occur into consideration when deciding if they should initiate a war.  For the same reason, the 
possibility of joining should affect the way states fight wars.  Belligerents may well try to 
prevent states from joining their wars, not only to maximize their odds of winning, but also to 
keep the costs of the war lower.  Therefore, states may limit their demands, engage in war 
fighting strategies that would otherwise appear to be suboptimal, and even terminate the war all 
to avoid potential joining.  Thus, it is important to study joining even though it is a somewhat 
rare phenomenon as its possibility as well as its actual occurrence influences how wars are 
fought and even if they are fought at all.  While this has been done in regards to extended 
deterrence and alliance reliability, more work in this area could and should be done. 
 As to further work directly related to the issues studied here, the findings could be 
extended to civil wars.  Additionally, lesser forms of intervention, especially armed mediation, 
could be looked at to see if they affect war duration in similar ways.  It would be discouraging 
for the prospects of certain types of humanitarian and peace keeping operations (such as UN 
Chapter Seven missions), though such possible negative effects have been suggested before 
(Luttwak, 1999).  Finally, a few case studies may prove useful to ensure the dynamic processes 
associated with joining affect war duration in the manner suggested by the correlations found 
herein.  Large n studies are necessary to ensure a relationship is general, but have important 
limitations in tracing causal mechanisms.  Cases, of course, have the opposite strengths and 
24 
 
weaknesses.  For this reason, the exploration of several cases would help flesh out the processes 
explored, though cases alone cannot substitute for the broader findings.  Thus, our understanding 
of how joining affects the course of wars is far from complete, but obtaining that understanding 
is important if we are to fully understand how and why wars are fought. 
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Table Ia:  Wars by War-Day: Non-Dummy Variables 
 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Min Value Max Value 
Duration 894.026 635 843.815 1 3735 
Late Joining All Belligerents 0.051 0 0.182 0 1 
Late Joining Major Belligerents 0.019 0 0.113 0 1 
Early Joining All Belligerents 0.012 0 0.093 0 1 
Early Joining Major Belligerents 0.009 0 0.082 0 1 
Relative Capabilities 0.765 0.780 0.154 0.501 0.993 
Terrain 0.303 0.259 0.220 0 0.75 
Belligerents (all Belligerents) 4.585 2 3.880 2 16 





Table Ib:  Wars by War-Day: Dummy Variables 
 All Belligerents Major Belligerents 
 Zero One Zero One 
Great Power in the War 13,523 17,300 13,523 17,300 
Great Power Both Sides 22,904 7,919 22,904 7,919 
Democracy  18,489 12,334 18,489 12,334 
Mixed Regime  3,100 27,723 5,171 25,652 
Enduring Rivalry 12,367 18,456 15,686 15,137 
Territorial Issue 12,377 18,446 12,377 18,446 
Regime Issue 24,996 5,827 24,996 5,827 
OADM 30,285 538 30,285 538 
OADA 9,085 21,738 9,085 21,738 
OADP 26,105 4,718 26,105 4,718 





Table Ic:  Wars as a Single Case: Non-Dummy Variables 
 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Min Value Max Value 
Duration 442.835 141 738.189 5   3735 
Log of Deaths 9.410 8.987 2.230 6.813 16.627 
Relative Capabilities 0.782   0.787 0.145     0.514      0.987 
Terrain 0.321           0.350 0.212           0   0.75 
Belligerents (all Belligerents) 3.481              2 3.170           2 16 






Table Id:  Wars as a Single Case: Dummy Variables 
 All Belligerents Major Belligerents 
 Zero One Zero One 
Early One-sided Joining 70 9 71 8 
Early Two-sided Joining 78 1 78 1 
Late One-sided Joining 72 7 74 5 
Late Two-sided Joining 76 3 76 3 
Great Power in the War 41 38 41 38 
Great Power Both Sides 68 11 68 11 
Democracy  45 34 45 34 
Mixed Regime  35 44 35 44 
Enduring Rivalry 40 39 40 39 
Territorial Issue 36 43 36 43 
Regime Issue 70 9 70 9 
One Side uses Maneuver 56 7 56 7 
All Sides use Attrition 10 53 10 53 





Table II:  Duration—Late and Early Joining 
 All Joiners  Major Joiners 




















_t (scale effects)     

























































































































ln_p (shape effects)     
















Non-proportional hazard coefficients using a Weibull distribution reported for both the scale (_t) and 
shape (ln_p) parameters with robust standard errors in parentheses.  * denotes significance at 0.05, ** at 





Table III:  War Duration in Days 
All Wars Wars w/ Joining Wars w/ Late 
Joining 
After Joining After Late 
Joining 





Table IV: Duration--One vs. Two-sided joining 
 All Belligerents Major Belligerents 











































































































































Cox proportional hazard ratios reported with robust standard errors in parentheses.  * denotes significance 






Table V:  War Severity 
 All Joiners Major Joiners 
























Duration       0.003***   
(0.000) 
      0.002***    
(0.000) 
      0.003***   
(0.000) 
     0.002***   
(0.000) 
































Great Power Both Sides    1.491 
 (0.817) 




1.136        
(0.730) 
















Relative Capabilities  1.328 























Regime Issue 0.412 
(0.567) 
















OADP   -4.558* 
(1.551) 
---------   -4.097**   
(1.480) 
--------- 
OPDA   -7.380**    
(2.188) 
















OLS coefficients reported with robust standard errors in parentheses.  * denotes significance at 
0.05, ** at 0.01, and *** at 0.001. 
 
 
 
